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I

REPLY REQUIRED
The "Response" filed by defendants-respondents calls for
a reply from plaintiff-appellant.
The additional brief is believed to be completely unwarranted
and presumptuous, because the case cited to support the proposition
that the notice of appeal is fatally defective was available at the time
of preparation of defendants-respondents' appeal brief and is not in
response to a new issue. Moreover, under the heading "Plaintiff Was
Not Denied Due Process", the quotation from a transcript of lower
court proceedings after the appeal was filed and appeal briefs had been
submitted sheds no new light on the issues in the appeal. It seems clear,
that both are merely excuses for belated and prolonged argument in a
transparent attempt to obtain the last word in an otherwise legitimate
exchange of briefs.
NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NITT FATALLY DEFECTIVE
It is submitted that defendants-respondents' reliance on the
cited case of Walker v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Association, 268 F. 2d 16 (CCA 9th, 1959) is misplaced. If anything
the case supports plaintiff-appellant's position that this appeal is proper.
In the first place, the factual situation is very different.
The plaintiff-appellant in the cited case had pleaded and appeared in
propria persona and had failed to either establish jurisdiction or state
-1-
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i
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a cause of action by the allegations in the original, amended, and
proposed to be amended complaints.

After dismissal of the action,

she made four motions designed to reinstate the lawsuit. The lower
court denied these motions.

On appeal, the motion to set aside the

order of dismissal and for leave to file an amended complaint was
considered by the court to be, in effect, a motion to alter or amend
the order, under Rule 59(e) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

Court reasoned that, since a motion for a new trial gives the trial
judge power to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, and, if the
motion is denied, such denial may be reviewed for manifest abuse of
discretion, the same should be true for a motion to alter or amend.
It applied this reasoning in the case then at bar and held that, under
the circumstances, there had been no manifest abuse of discretion.
It should be noted that the Court held the appeal had been
timely filed and considered both the merits of the original order of
dismissal and the merits of the denial of the motion to alter or amend.
In their main Brief, defendants -respondents have taken the
position (p. 8) that a request for a new trial is not appealable.

Plaintiff-

Appellant has argued that its motion was, in effect, a motion to alter
or amend the Order of January 24, 1977, holding that royalties are due
on the Nordell-Kimball cab latch.

Whichever way it is viewed, irnplicir

in this appeal is the proposition that the trial court erred and abused
any discretion it might have had to grant or deny the motion.
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THE APPEAL IS NITT UNTIMELY
Defendants-Respondents now argue that plaintiff-appellant's
motion was one for reconsideration of the Amended Decree of July 30,
1975, which awarded plaintiff-appellant an exclusive license under
the Brimhall patents for the life of such patents subject to payment of
a royalty, and that such a motion is untimely.
This is a completely illogical argument. Plaintiff-Appellant
did not appeal from that decision favorable to it, did not move for
reconsideration of that decision, and does not now urge any alteration
of that decision.
Neither does plaintiff-appellant seek the introduction of
new or additional evidence with respect to that decision.

Rather,

defendants -respondents asked the lower court to hold plaintiff-appellant
in contempt for not paying royalty on a product manufactured under a
different patent. This appeal arises from the lower court's refusal
to conform to the requirements of the United States Patent Laws and
~be

to accepted practice thereunder by holding royalties,. due under a patent
and on a product not subjected to proper scrutiny by the Court from the
standpoint of patent validity and infringement.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS
Defendants-Respondents insist that, because the lower court
had knowledge of the Nordell-Kimball cab latch (the so-called "black

-3-
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cab latch") prior to entry of the Amended Decree of July 30, 197S
(which would also be prior to entry of the Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law), it had sufficient facts and details before
it to justify the finding that royalties are due on such product.
But, if that had been so, certainly the lower court would
have made formal findings and conclusions to that effect, which it
did not do.
It is submitted that it was improper for defendants respondents to ask, and for the lower court to decide, that the NordellKimball cab latch comes within the scope of its Amended Decree of
July 30, 1975, without proof that such cab latch comes within the
scope of and is subject to the licensed Brimhall patents.
The comments of the trial judge, the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, quoted at page S of the so-called "Response" from the transcript of a hearing (September 23, 1977) on several motions brought by
defendants-respondents, provides no effective support for the decision
and clearly shows that there was an abuse of discretion with respect
to denying plaintiff-appellant a proper evidentiary hearing. From
mere external observation, without reference to Brimhall patent
description or claims, without benefit of the explanation and differ entiation that gained Messrs. Nordell and Kimball a separate patent
from a presumably skilled and knowledgeable patent examiner, and
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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without consideration of patent validity, the trial judge decided only
"that the black cab latch is sufficiently identical with the original cab
latch that royalties should be paid on it".
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE NITT IMPROPER
Although the Nordell -Kimball patent is not of record, its
existence has been recognized by defendants-respondents and is a
fact to be considered on the appeal.
As to the matter of asserted resistance to royalty payments,
plaintiff-appellant stands on its Reply Brief, pages 1 and 2.
It is true that the transcript of proceedings shows no
objection being voiced on behalf of plaintiff-appellant. This is due
to the sudden departure of the court reporter and to the fact that
defendants-respondents' suggestion for and the resulting discussion
as to the propriety of the trial judge informally viewing the exhibits
(which had been set up in the courtroom by defendants-respondents),
without setting a time for a proper evidentiary hearing, came after
departure of the court reporter and, indeed, after formal closing
of the Court.
ADDENDUM TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Since the filing of plaintiff-appellant's reply brief, the
decision in Milprint, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 579; 192 USPQ
769 (DCE Wisc. Feb. 24, 1977) (see page 16 of the reply brief) has been
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affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

A copy of the as

yet unpublished decision is included herein as an appendix.
It is significant, indeed, to note that the Federal Circuit
Court affirmed the lower court in its dismissal of the complaint that
sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and patent invalidity,
in view of the fact that such complaint was filed by the defendantsrespondents in an action in the State court for royalties due under a
license agreement, and that the case of Public Service Commission
of Utah v. Wycoff Company, Inc., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952) was discussed
(at pages 6 and 7) and its logic was held to control the outcome of the
case then at bar.
It is submitted that there can be no question but that the
lower court in the present case must confront, and not avoid, proper
application of the patent law as urged by plaintiff-appellant in its main
Brief, particularly pages 12 -14 thereof.
Respectfully submitted,

Of counsel:
A. Wally Sandack
SANDACK & SANDACK
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tflt &tbtntb €ircuit

No. 77-1049
MILPRINT, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appella11t,

v.
Cuawooo,

INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal ·from lhe United Si...1,.. lJi•trict Courl for lhe
Eu tern Dl~trict or \\' 1scon."'i n.
No. 76-C-201-John \\'. Keynoh.la, J..d~.

ARGUED APRIL 19, 1977-DEi:IDt;D SEPTEMBER 14, 1977

l.
·I
I

Before PELL, TONE, and Wooo, Circuit Judges.
PELL, Circuit Judge. Appellee Curwood, Inc., is the
owner of a patent covering a plastic laminated film
product. In 1970, Curwood advised appellant Milprint,
Inc., that it should either take a license under the patent
or prepare for an infringement suit. By two agreements
in April 1971 Milprint took a license but reserved its
right to contest the validity of the patent. In mid-1973,
Milprint ceased making royalty payments due under the
license agreement and on March 1. 1976. Curwood
instituted an action for royalties in the Circuit Court of
Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. Diversity between the
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No. 77-!r.;

parties being lacking. the state court, as wil!
discussed hereinafter, was the only forum availa~:e ·
Curwood.
On March 22. 1976. Milprint filed in the district c1;
a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to thee::,
that Curwood's then-current reissue patent ana
predecessor were invalid. that no further royalties.,,,.
due Curwood under the license agreements. and :·
Milprint was entitled to return of the royalties r:
between 1971 and 1973. A separate count o(:
complaint alleged breaches of the agreements
Curwood and sought similar declarations as to roy•.:
On April 1, Milprint filed a petition removing the;::
court case to the district court. The district er·
remanded the case because it had been "remo.·
improvidently and without jurisdiction." 28 U
§ 1447(c). 1 In the same decision and order. the dis::
court rejected Curwood's argument that the case s~.c.
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. but noneti:E'
dismissed the declaratory action b~cause of the ;'
dency of the state court suit.
Milprint's appeal attacks only the propriety of·
district court's discretionary dismissal. and Cur.1:·
apparently satisfied with a dismissal on any groi;na ~
not pressed its jurisdictional objection in this coun ·
objection made in the district court was that M1;rr·J
declaratory action does not "aris[e) under any .-k
Congress relating to pa~ents" within the meaning c;·J
U.S.C. § 1338(a).~ The district court was of the v1< 11 ·
1 By unreported order of February 11, 1977. this r:I
dismissed ~!ilprint's appeal from this :-emand order l•g'
of appellate JUrisdict1on. C11nrnod. Inc. I'. J[1/pnn' .. '
No. 77-1050. ~ee 28 U.S.C. § 14.;/(dl: Thrn11tron Pr--~
Inc. v. Hennansdorfer . .;23 U.S. 336, 343 (1~76).
1
Section ~338(a) provides:
. .
. . . . ,.,,
The d1str1ct courts shall have original iunsd?cuon.: 1
civil action arisin~ under any Act of Congre;s re'·: .•
patents. plant variety protection. copyrights anu ·.1
marks. Such jurisdiction shall be cxclus1n: of the c;:.j
the states in patent, plant variety protect10n and :c,:
cases.
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the action "ma.nifestly does" so arise. Because the matter
does not seem to us to be so simple. we must first decide
whether the district court had jurisdiction of the case.
See· Arv·in Industries, Inc. v. Berns Air King Corpor-

ation, 510 F.2d 1070, 1072 (7th Cir. 1975).
It has long been clear. notwithstanding the substantial
federal interest in patent matters, that there is no
exclusive federal jurisdiction over questions arising
under the patent Jaws; only ca,~es so arising may be
brought in the federal courts. PrnttT. Paris Gns Liyht &
Coke Com]Jany. 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897). Consistent with
the oft-cited lrinciple stated by Justice Holmes in
American Wei Wurl.:.~ Co. l'. Layne & Boll'ler Co., 241
U.S 257, 260 (1916) (in which patent jurisdiction was
asserted). that "[a) suit arises under the Jaw that creates
the cause of action," it is well established that
[w]hile a suit for infringement of a patent arises
under the p_atent Jaws ;rnd is therefore cognizable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). a suit to enforce an
undertaking to pay royalties for the use of a patent
arises under state law and is not within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Albright v. Teas,
106 U.S. 613 ... (1883); Luckett v. Delpark, Inc.,
270 U.S. 496, 510 ... (1926).
Aroin lndustrie.~. supra. 510 F.2d at 1072-73. 3 A patent
licensor whose licensee has broken the agreement is not
without choice between a state and a federal forum. It
can, for example. declare the license forfeited for breach
of a condition subsequent and sue for infringement. If it
, is correct as to its. right to declare such a forfeiture
unilaterally (a question of state law) federal jurisdiction
of the infringement suit exists. Luckett 1·. Delpark, Inc.,
supra, 270 U.S. at 511. But where the licensor stands on
r

•

.

3

Under these principles. there can be no doubt that the
count of Milprint s complaint which allel!'eS Curwood's breaches of the license ag-reemcnt and seeks, thus. a declaration that
Milprint is entitled to return of already paid royalties. has no
jurisdictional significance. This count sounds exclusi\'ely in
contract, and. unlike the other count, does not even assert the
existence of patent law issues.
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the license agreement and seeks contract remedie<.,
~n. all_eg!ltion of infri.ngement will. not create ft:;,
JUr1sd1ct10n, for the existence of the license precludt,
1><>ssibility of infringement. Arvin lndu.stries, oupr"
F.2d at 1073.
These principles lead straight to the conclusion :1
Curwood's state court royalties suit, diversity t;l
absent, could have been brought nowhere else bu: j
state court. Curwood's suit is a prototypal one of aq
that arises under state, not federal patent ..:I
Milprint's assertions that the underlying paten•o I
invalid could be asserted b:t way _of defense in th!'I
court. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkrns, 39v U.S. 653, 669·,J
(1969).

1

The questions at hand are whether Milprint'sl
a·
does anything more than seek to establish what~
be its defenses in the state court royalties action. a:.
not, whether the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 [
§ 2201, somehow allows Milprint to test a deiei:
federal court that could, without the Act, on,:
raised in state court.
We answer the first que.;tion in the negative ..~I
have remarked, the sec:ond count of the con::J
which asserts something akin to a tral:1
rescission cause of action, must be disregard1:
jurisdictional purposes. See n.3 supra. The bala~··
the complaint, while it asserts the invalidity o!
wood's patents, is entirely geared to the royalty a.
The existence of the license agreements, and a gi
ized statement of their terms, are alleged, bu:
nowhere stated that the license has been termi"''
either party. In fact, the complaint specifically aid~
existence of Curwood's pending state court ;;
enforce payment of royalties. The relief sought

133&~

• It should be recalled here that 28 U.S.C. §
federal jurisdiction of cases ari~ing under the patr
1zclusil'e. Absent diversity, the propriety of a stat~ f.'.'.~
e.g.• Lear. supra, necessarily 1molies the none~ 1 -:·
federal jurisdiction. Sec Chisum, The Allocatwn QI':
tio11 bet1('ee11 State and Feifrral Cuurts in Pate11t lil:q 1
WASH. L. REV. 633, 670 (1970).
'
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than a declaration of patent invalidity and of the rights
of the parties under the license agreement, is specifically aimed at eliminating l\Iilprint's royalty obligations.
This is, thus, a quite di ffercnt case than would be
pn•5ented by a complaint alleging that a licensee's nonpayment of royalties gave it reason to fear the licensor
would declare a forfeiture and sue for infringement. By
alleging that Curwood is standing on the license
agreement, Milprint forecloses that possibility. See
:lrriu fodu.stries, supra, 510 F.2d at 1073; Thiokol
Cl1i·111icr1/ Corporation v. H1trliHgton Industries, Inc., 448
F.2d 1328. 1330 n.2 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1019 (1972). In fact, the word "infringement" does not
t'nm appear in the complaint. For purposes of jurisdiction, then, this case is nothing more than Milprint's
attt'mpt to use the Declaratory Judgment Act to
t'Stablish a federal defense to an action grounded
t'Xclusively in state Jaw, which could only be and has
been brought in state court.
We believe the attempt must fail. The Act provides, 28

U.S.C. § 2201, that "[i]n a case of actual controversy
IC'itlii11 its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States

... may declare the rights and other legal relations of
any interested party seeking such declaration . . . . "
(Emphasis supplied.) By its terms, the Act makes
d{•claratory judgment jurisdiction dependent on the
traditional grants of jurisdiction by which conventional
coercive suits would be judged.
"[T]he operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is
procedural only." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
aoo U.S. 227. 240 [1937]. Congress enlarged the
range of remedies available in the federal courts
but did not extend their jurisdiction.
Skdly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Cu., 339 U.S. 667,
Iii 1 ( 1!)50).
In Skdly Oil, the declaratory plaintiff sought to have
its rhrht to contract performance adjudicated. The
dcfondants had stated they would not perform because

-ll-
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the contract was conditioned on the issuance
1
F.ederal Power Commission certificate of public •.
nience and necessity to plaintiff. which had. it 11a; J
not ?~en issued in ti1'.:~· The.. mm plaint ~llegcd ~~.: 1
cert1f1cate had been issued in time. :\otw1thstc·
that the time of issuance of the certificate was a :,.'i
l~w question critical to plaintiff'::; reco\•ery., and tr,,:
dispute thereon had to be pleaded to establi:;h a li1c
troversy, the Supreme Court held there was no :t:
jurisdiction. in accordance with the long-establisn;:
that the plaintiffs claim must present a federal Q.:
without reference to anticipated defenses. Id. at 6:~
Louisvi'.lle and .Vushvi/le Hailroad Co111pany t'. .\!;'
211 U.S. 149 (1908). The Court stated:
To sanction suits for declaratory relief as with1:
jurisdiction of the District Courts merely bee<
as in this case, artful pleading anticipates ade:
based on federal law would contravene the·•
trend of jurisdictional legislation by Con_
disregard the effective functioning of the ft:
judicial system and distort the limited procec
11urpose of the Declaratory J udgmcnt Act t
Developmrnt.~ in the /,riw-D1'claratory J11dq11•.d
1941·1949. 62 Harv. L. Rev. 787, 802-03 t19;,.

339 U.S. at 673-74.
Here, unlike Skelly Oil, the federal "defen~·
asserted as the claim of the declaratory p!a1:
Procedurally, of course, this is part of wha:
Declaratory Judgment Act is all about. but we th1r.·
jurisdictional principles should be the same. The~·
Court apparently agreed. The very portion 01
HARVARD LAW REVIEW Comment cited appromr.·
the Court reached the conclusion that a declar;
action seeking to test a defense should be tria.ble i:.
federal courts only if it would normally arise in a"'
to a complaint which itseif would properly ri.;
federal question. Citing the same Comment. the Co:
Public Scn·ice Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Cmn;.
Inc .. 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952), observed that "[w]h<'i
complaint in an action for declaratory jud~ment '"''
essence to assert a defense to an impena1r.;
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thm1trned state court action. it is the character of the
thrl'atened action. and not of the defense, which will
tll'll•rmine whether there is federal-question jurisdiction
in the District Court."
In our opinion the logic of Skelly Oil and W11coff controls this case. It is true, that the Declaratory
.Jud~mcnt Act does allow cases to be brought in federal
courts which would not. for lack of a proper coercive
r1"1111·d11, otherwise be there. But it would be anomalous
tu con.elude that an Act which provides only proceduml
and re111cdial flexibility somehow allows a party to
in\'oke federal question jurisdiction to adjudicate its
fl•drral defense to an exclusivelv state law action.
Accordingly, we hold that where d·iversity is lacking, a
patent licensee's declaratory complaint which asserts
patent invalidity simply to avoid the obligations of the
license does not state a claim arising under the patent
laws within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).5 The
Third Circuit has flatly so held. Thiokol Chemical
Cm'Jlflration. supra, 4-18 F.2d 1328, and the Tenth
Circuit in Product E11yi11eering and Jlan11facturi11g. Inc.
'" Barnes, 42-1 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1970), while considerinJr the jurisdictional issue in conjunction with a
discretionary dismissal issue much as is presented
here, with some resulting loss in conceptual clarity, did
~

Because the importance of respecting jurisdictional limits

orum leads federal courts to examine their jurisdiction even

where the parties do not ~uestion it, it mi~ht be argued that
f.'dwunl Kat:i119a c(). I', (lticru10 .\fe/11/lic .ila1111/n.cturi11q Co..
:1:!!1 U.S. 39-1 (19-17), embodies ar. implicit holding tnat a
lil'l•nsce can invoke federal ;urisdiction to test a federal
valhlity defense. We think it does not. for three reasons. First.
thl' dc-claratory plaintiff in Kat::i11!1•·1· had not only ceased
rornltv pavments but had also terminated the license and
,;ou~hi declaration not only of invalidity but also of noninCrin~cmcnt. Second. even if this were not so, we doubt that
:uw such implicit r.nd unconsidered ~holding" survived Skelly
t>il and ll'w,.//. Third. diversity jurisdiction may, for all that
app,·ars. have existed in Kntzi11ya. The existence of diversity
jurisdiction. which is shown by court records but not
nwntinncd in the 0pinions. exµlains this court's unquestioning
an·i·ptancl' of Juri-cdi<.:tion in two recent declaratory actions by
lirl'l\Sl'('~. c·. ..;_l[ C11r1111/'l/fio11 I'. Sta11durrl /'rt'S.<t'tl Sh',./ c(/., 52-1
F.:!d IU97 (7th Cir. l~l75): and lJn·J.:1111111 J,,.,fr1w11·11ts. /11c. '"
7i·d111irnl j),.,.,./,,µ111rnl C11r1w1·11tio11. 4:!3 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.
1!1711), n·rt.drnii-d, 401 U.S. 976 (1!171).
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expressly affirm the district court's conclusion t>,.
action virtually identical to this one "was pu;;,
contract action which properly should be litiga•eJ ,;
• ••
State court." Id. at 43. 6
We have considered and found without mer:t
issues raised by l\lilprint including the contention;
it is an imposition on a ~tate judicial system tor
its judges to resolve complex issues under federal
statutes with which they are generally unfamiliar
that there are potential discovery limitations at the
forum level. Aside from the fact that we are cog:
of frequent federal judicial recognitio;i of the co~ru.
ability of state courts to handle difficult leg"-! qc
including federal constitutional ones. we are unaw
any basis in contentions such as those presently·
for according jurisdiction to a court when thatiu
tion does not otherwise exist.
Although our reasons differ from those used~
district court, we conclude that the judgrn
dismissal must be, and it hereby is,

A true Copy:
· Teste:

Clerk of the United States C
Appeals for the Set'enth C'
' Indeed. this court has recently indicated the r.
reach today. In S11pcr Pmrl11ct:; Corporation t'. DP l\a1
poratio1,, 5·1G F.2d 7~8. 75.1 n.8 (7th Cir. 1976). a cl.le
ly concerned with the existence of a real case or con1
it was observed. citing Tlizr,kol, i<11pra. that
(t]he plaintiffs . stake must be an interest in !
111/r111yc111c11t l1t1qatw11 or the threat of such l1u ...
satisfy the ... jurisdictional requirement thal""
arise under the patent law. [Emphasis supplied.) ~
USCA ~216-~lidwest Law Prinllnll' Co .. Inc .. Ch1ca~o-~·ll·~
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